# Crime, community safety and toleration

Lynn Hancock and Roger Matthews

# Introduction

The recently published Home Office Statement of Purpose informs us that its aim is:

> To build a safe, just and tolerant society, in which the rights and responsibilities of individuals, families and communities are balanced, and the protection and security of the public are maintained.
>
> (Home Office 1998)

This claim appears at first sight to be eminently commendable and there are few in Britain who, if asked, would not identify with some if not all of these objectives. However, as has been pointed out, rather than strive to develop a more tolerant society, recent British government policies have been associated with the 'regimentation of opinion, moral closure, the repression of dissent and institutional intolerance' (Hughes 1998). In contrast to the stated aim of promoting greater levels of tolerance government policy has expressed a profound intolerance for a range of activities including noisy neighbours, squeegee merchants, youths hanging around the streets as well as other forms of 'anti-social' behaviour (Muncie 1999). Significantly, most of the activities which have become the object of official intolerance in recent years are, in themselves, relatively innocuous. Nevertheless, we are reminded that we are now engaged in a 'war against crime' and a 'war against drugs', although it is not clear whether these are two fronts of the same war or two different wars. Either way, the language of war presents offenders as the enemy to be defeated or dominated, rather than helped or tolerated. At the same time the emphasis on zero tolerance, or selective intolerance as it has been more accurately described, has been actively pursued by different agencies and given considerable official support. Being 'tough on crime and the causes of crime' means, according to the Home Secretary Jack Straw, the instigation of 'tough and consistent prison sentences for serious criminals', and he insists that the 'purpose of our criminal justice system is to catch and punish offenders not to make excuses for them' (Straw 1999). Within this punitive paradigm, the focus is largely on punishment, incapacitation, longer prison sentences and generally getting tough on offenders. There is little attention given to disadvantage, mitigation, rehabilitation or toleration.

Government-sponsored campaigns to inform on drug dealers, welfare

scroungers and other 'anti-social' groups are designed to encourage citizens to display increasing intolerance towards certain forms of activity and these have run alongside anti-sexist and anti-racist campaigns which have called for greater intolerance of what are increasingly deemed to be unacceptable acts and attitudes. Thus it is apparent that the government is formally calling for greater tolerance while simultaneously pursuing a strategy of selective intolerance. The implicit message which is conveyed in recent policy developments in the field of 'law and order' would seem to be that greater intolerance is the route to a safer and more just society.

How can we make sense of this apparent contradiction? We could simply dismiss it as an example of hypocrisy or as a consequence of the inevitable gap between rhetoric and reality, or the mismatch between intentions and outcomes. Or more cynically we could see it as a product of the 'New Managerialism' which, while espousing the virtues of cost effectiveness, spends valuable time producing mission statements and statements of purpose that are either bland, vague or in some cases totally vacuous. However, rather than just dismiss this statement of purpose or engage in deep cynicism (although this does have a certain attraction), our intention is to show that embedded in the Home Office's Statement of Purpose are some important issues centred around the notion of tolerance and that these are linked to an unresolved political tension between liberalism and communitarianism.

Consequently, this chapter has two main aims. First, to articulate the notion of toleration, which we believe to be a much misunderstood concept, and at the same time to examine its largely unacknowledged role as centrally organising concept of sociological investigation. Second, we aim to examine both the liberal and the communitarian approaches to toleration and attempt to show that the tension which is evident in current crime control and community safety policy arises from an uneasy mix of these two political doctrines.

## What is toleration?

'Toleration' is a term, which like 'community', is virtually devoid of any negative associations. Tolerance suggests respect for others, a recognition of individual rights, as well as an acceptance of individual difference and social diversity. It is,

however, not an expression of benevolence, but rather it embodies a sense of disapproval and implies a degree of suffering or sufferance (Yovel 1998). The working definition of 'tolerance' which is widely used is: 'The deliberate choice not to interfere with conduct or beliefs, with which one disapproves'. In this way we might distinguish tolerance from indifference and from those situations where there may be no real choice over whether to take action or not. Thus in examining the exercise of toleration we need to know something about the reasons for intervention and non-intervention (Horton and Nicholson 1992).

Public tolerance is not the same thing as public opinion. Public opinion, as expressed in public attitude surveys, asks people what. they would advocate whereas the notion of toleration is concerned with what people will accept or be willing to endorse under certain circumstances. For example, a public opinion survey may characteristically ask what length of sentence members of the public would advocate for a certain type of crime whereas what respondents might be willing to live with or tolerate may be considerably different (Turner et al. 1997). Thus the term toleration is much broader than public opinion and not only involves some consideration of spontaneously expressed viewpoints, but invites a more detailed consideration of the range and depth of public attitudes.

The notion of toleration, although mainly discussed and refined by political philosophers, is central to the understanding of crime, law and punishment. The distinction between crime and incivilities, law and norms, as well as the application of different sanctions, is conditioned by the prevailing forms of toleration. Although it is the case that in relation to certain activities such as rape, murder and robbery there may be a relatively high degree of consensus that these offences should not be tolerated, the situation becomes more complicated when we consider forms of social disorder or non-criminal activity (Burney 1999), since those committing lesser transgressions may well claim some 'right' to engage in these activities (e.g., to buy or sell sex, to play music, to 'hang around' on the street), and this right is itself associated with notions of freedom and autonomy (Mendus 1989; Newey 1999). Inasmuch as the concept of toleration has featured in the criminological literature it is often presented as a uni-dimensional expression of free-floating benevolence. However, a review of the relevant literature suggests that it has a number of important attributes.

First, the notion of tolerance is profoundly social and arises out of social interaction and in tum serves to regulate that interaction. It involves an expression

of power in that it suggests the ability to limit or influence the activity of others, and like the concept of power as Michel Foucault (1979) has shown, it is a relational concept. Just as people do not simply 'hold' or 'exercise' power over others, so toleration implies a degree of reciprocity and mutual recognition. Second, toleration is tied to the material conditions of existence in that the decisions over the expression of tolerance are conditioned by the structural location and situational pressures of those expressing tolerance. Thus the class, gender or ethnic position of those involved in this relation will deeply influence the nature of tolerance involved and how it is expressed. Third, it is purposeful and intentional. The expression of toleration is a rational and conscious act even if it is expressed through inaction. As sociologists have consistently pointed out, refraining from engaging in an act is no less meaningful than the decision to engage in one. It is also no less real in its consequences. Fourth, like concepts such as 'trust' or 'stigma' the notion of toleration will normally exhibit a number of different dimensions, which may not in themselves appear as complementary or consistent. As a multi-dimensional concept it will contain ambiguities and uncertainties. Thus, any investigation of toleration will require a multifaceted form of enquiry which will also need to be able to distinguish between the object of toleration and the mode of expression.

Finally, toleration is an intrinsically moral concept. It implies exercising judgement, taking responsibility and making choices between that which is acceptable and unacceptable. It is the case that we may tolerate things which we believe to be wrong, but this does not preclude the fact that our decision to tolerate involves an element of moral choice (Bauman 1995).

## The centrality of toleration to criminological investigation

A number of well-known criminological terms have all been associated with the expression of intolerance. These include 'shaming', 'censure', 'stigmatisation' and 'labelling', and each of these concepts have been influential in criminology in different periods (Goffman 1963; Schur 1971; Sumner 1990). Their relation to the term toleration, which is arguably a more generic concept, is often alluded to but rarely explained. At a more general level the concept of toleration is directly and indirectly associated with a number of central concepts in criminology such as fairness,

culpability, equity and responsibility which inform the meta-theories of crime and justice in both everyday life and among criminal justice agencies.

Over the past few years a number of criminological texts have touched in various ways upon the issue of toleration. In particular, those which have explored issues connected with punishment and sentencing have addressed the relation between changing penal practices and climates of public opinion in different periods. These investigations have been encouraged by a sense that there is considerable agreement within and across advanced western societies in relation to the appropriate forms and levels of punishment (Doob and Roberts 1988; Garland 1990; Young and Brown 1993).

Among these contributors a number have drawn on Norbert Elias' (1994) work on the 'civilising process'. Elias' focus is on how people have internalised social constraint, become more self-disciplined and learned to manage their feelings in a more discreet way. As a result of growing social interdependency coupled with the formation of a centralised state authority which claimed a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, people in Europe have, he argues, become less tolerant of overt demonstrations of violence. It has been claimed that Elias' work provides a non-economistic account of changing attitudes towards public demonstrations of violence. In particular, his approach has been used as a basis for explaining the demise of public executions and the development of the modern prison (Franke 1992; Spierenburg 1984). Elias' approach, however, while containing suggestive observations on changing forms of toleration historically, has been charged with vagueness, evolutionism and a one-dimensional understanding of social change (van Krieken 1989). Most damaging for the Elisian approach is the claim that it is unable to effectively account for the reversals and ambiguities which have been identified in the deployment of punishment historically and that it is not very useful in explaining a number of contemporary developments, such as the decline of the rehabilitative ideal, the emergence of the 'new penology' and the 'new correctionalism' with its return to boot camps as well as· the use of chain gangs alongside the development of other 'decivilising' processes (Pratt 1998; Vaughan 2000).

A more focused and grounded approach which has linked the issue of toleration to expressions of punitiveness has been presented by Leslie Wilkins and Ken Pease (1987) who have suggested that one of the cultural determinants of society's penal climate is its relative egalitarianism. That is, they claim that the greater the society's tolerance of inequality, the more extreme the scale of punishment is likely

to be. Just as those at the top are seen to receive disproportionate rewards for their achievement so those at the bottom end of the social scale who 'fail' are punished particularly severely. Thus, countries that have a highly individualistic and competitive ethos, they argue, and in which there is a high degree of inequality will tend to be comparatively severe in the use punishment. Mobilising solid comparative evidence, however, to test this hypothesis is difficult given the limited nature of the available data (Pease 1994). The United States is the usual point of reference in debates over relative punitiveness, particularly since currently it has in excess of two million people incarcerated. However, while there is evidence that the US tends to impose longer sentences for a range of crimes, the use of incarceration itself is not, in general, too dissimilar from European countries (Langham and Farrington 1998). Variations between European countries provide only limited support for the hypotheses, while it is clear that the use of imprisonment, for example, in different countries is also likely to be conditioned by other factors such as the availability of non-custodial sanctions and the degree of social and political stability. Nevertheless, it remains a relevant and plausible hypothesis.

One of the few attempts to analyse explicitly the role of tolerance in shaping systems of punishment was the study by David Downes (1988) of the different use of sanctions in England and Wales and in the Netherlands. Downes saw the different approaches to the use of imprisonment and alternatives to custody in these two countries as a function of 'contrasts in tolerance'. He attributes the relatively low use of incarceration in the post-war period in the Netherlands to a greater level of tolerance than existed in England and Wales, although he points out that Dutch tolerance does not involve a 'blanket acceptance of all manner of behaviour and opinion'. Rather, it is a selective strategy based on a 'politics of accommodation' which relies less on scapegoating and the exclusion of deviants and instead provides a more integrative approach. Herman Franke (1990) in a critical review of Downes' Contrasts in Tolerance, emphasises that tolerance is not of one piece and therefore it is inappropriate to talk about a 'culture of tolerance'. Instead, there is a need, he argues, to examine the history, the political context, the composition and orientation of criminal justice agencies as well as the role of the media in influencing the exercise of tolerance.

In relation to the construction of crime it has been pointed out by radical realists that public attitudes, informal normative structures and sanctions are a critical dimension of the 'square of crime' (Lea 1992; Matthews and Young 1992).

While it is the case that victims as primary definers playa critical role in transforming incidents or 'problematic situations' into potential 'crimes' the decision to report will not only be conditioned by the gravity of the offence, the willingness of the police to take it seriously or their ability to do something about it, but will also be dependent on the level and nature of public tolerance. The recent shift, for example, in attitudes towards interpersonal violence in which child abuse, domestic violence, bullying and the like have been 'rediscovered' reflects a changing framework of social attitudes which will affect individual decisions to report incidents (Pahl 1985; Saraga, 1996). It will also affect the sanctions imposed and the severity with which different kinds of offences are viewed. Thus, as Steven Box and Chris Hale (1986) have pointed out, it is essential when looking at the problem of crime to understand the social and cultural processes through which different types of activity become problematic. It is also necessary to understand why it is felt that certain activities can no longer be adequately dealt with informally and why the sanctions which were previously deployed to control certain deviant activities are no longer seen as being adequate. The importance of this point is that we should not simply see the growing public intolerance of certain types of incivilities or crimes as a consequence of the growth in crime, but rather regard both the growth of crime and the changing attitudes to punishment as two sides of the same process. This relation provides a useful corrective to those criminologists who see shifts in public tolerance purely as a reaction to higher levels of crime. Thus we might explain the steady increase in crime over the past two decades and the intensification and extension of punishment as a product of the twin effects of shifts in the nature of toleration. By the same token there is a need to identify those activities which have been effectively decriminalised over time or which have slipped down the 'law and order' agenda.

This two-way development is evident in the Crime and Disorder Act (1998) which on one side transforms a number of incivilities into criminal offences and simultaneously involves the intensification of the sanctions relating to each of these activities. In a similar vein, we have seen in recent years on both sides of the Atlantic how the 'war against drugs' has resulted in the criminalisation of a range of previously tolerated drug-taking activity and the widespread use of formal sanctions, particularly imprisonment (Tonry 1995). In this process the concern across the political spectrum associated with widespread illicit drug use can effectively be translated into forms of selective enforcement. Thus although shifts in the nature

of public toleration playa critical role in this process, and may be fuelled by media campaigns, this growing intolerance may be formally expressed through criminal justice agencies which have their own interests and organisational constraints. Of central importance, therefore, is the relation between informal and formal processes of regulation as well as the role of mediating institutions in shaping the nature and expression of toleration.

If we are correct in our claim that toleration is germane to the whole criminological enterprise, then why should it be that criminologists have historically been reticent to engage with this concept? We can suggest three main reasons. First, the issue of toleration is seen to be located in political philosophy which is a discipline that remains relatively unexplored by criminologists. Although it is the case that much of the more interesting criminological work in recent years has been that which has vicariously lifted ideas and materials from other disciplines -particularly sociology, urban studies and cultural studies -successful forays into the world of political philosophy have been less frequent. Second, toleration does not lend itself easily to direct measurement, since its exercise involves inaction as well as action. Since toleration is also a relational, complex and multi-faced activity its study requires a more imaginative and sophisticated form of analysis than is normally undertaken by criminologists. Third, an examination of toleration is likely to draw researchers into the perplexing areas of norm creation, systems of classification, and probably the area in which they feel most uncomfortable -morality (Bauman 1995; Cohen 1979).

## The growing interest in public tolerance

Despite the reluctance to engage directly with the notion of toleration a number of criminologists have begun to address the question of public attitudes (Hough and Roberts 1999; Mirrlees-Black et al. 1996). Policy-makers and funders who sense it is necessary to take some account of public attitudes are increasingly turning to public attitude surveys. These surveys, however, are fraught with methodological problems and are able at best to provide a 'snapshot' of public opinion and at worst provide a distorted one-dimensional picture of what members of the public actually think (Herbst 1998; Norris 1999). This shift in interest has been largely a consequence of external developments rather than arising from pressures

within the discipline itself. Among the major developments which have taken place in recent years are the changing role of the national state, globalisation, increased political apathy and cynicism, growing public insecurity, the fragmentation of communities and the breakdown of regulatory institutions, as well as growing anxieties about the direction of political leadership.

We are currently witnessing a significant change in the organisation and role of the national state. This involves a process in which decision-making is simultaneously becoming more global and international and more local. As a consequence, the sovereign state has spread the responsibility for crime control and community safety onto a range of statuary, private and voluntary agencies while sending out the message that the state alone is not, and cannot, be responsible for preventing and controlling crime (Garland 1996; Jessop 1994). There has also been a growing involvement of citizens in crime prevention and crime controL This, however, is not just a process of the state and other agencies pressurising local communities to take responsibility for their own security; but also represents a new social movement in which local social networks attempt to actively defend their communities from the effects of globalisation. The net result is that a significant proportion of citizens are involved, albeit in some cases on a token level, in crime prevention and community safety programmes through neighbourhood watch, tenants associations, block watch, citizen patrols, local support groups and other community-based organisations. An indication of this can be found in David Bayley's (1994) findings, that in New York organised self-protection activities on the part of citizens have mushroomed with over 151,000 people involved in crime prevention programmes in 1985. This involvement reflects a deeply felt need to supplement the usual police protection in the context of growing concerns about public security. Similar trends can be found in Britain. There are now over 150,000 neighbourhood watch schemes operating in England and Wales covering approximately 10 million households, although the involvement of these members may in some cases be fairly token. There are a growing number of tenants organisations, community liaison groups, citizen patrols and the like who are involved in crime control and improving public security (Hancock 2001). The growing involvement of local community groups has, however, been met with ambivalence by the state authorities, since the attempts to encourage 'active citizens' has been tempered by the spectre of vigilantism (Johnston 1996).

The devolving of responsibilities to local authorities following the publica-

tion of the Morgan Report in 1991 has given crime prevention and crime control a more differentiated and local focus. One consequence of this strategy, however, is that it has promoted interest in the experiences and attitudes of local populations. It also creates new demands and expectations from local residents which need to be accommodated. There is the prospect that within this emerging set of relations changes are likely to occur in the prioritisation of crime and disorder and that the newly established community safety groups will reflect local priorities and concerns as well as shifts in toleration.

Communities, however, have become more fragmented as a result of economic restructuring. As the routines and habits of everyday life are undermined through the introduction of new forms of flexible accumulation the basic trust in the security of the world has been thrown into disarray (see Young in this volume). In these conditions the willingness of citizens to tolerate difficult and deviant activities is likely to be curtailed, and creates a climate which encourages forms of scapegoating, particularly in the form of racism (Cohen 1998). It is often as the conditions for the expression of intolerance grow that official calls for greater tolerance arise.

The development of globalisation and the advent of the 'information society' has at the same time increased the complexity of decision-making and the plurality of values and interests which have to be taken into account such that the actors shap~ng our political life are themselves diminishing in stature. The lack of any clear profile amongst different political parties is associated with growing political apathy and cynicism. There is a consequentiallegitimation deficit and it becomes increasingly difficult to mobilise the population behind governmental policies. At this juncture there is seen to be a need to reinvigorate flagging institutions and to increase confidence, particularly in the criminal justice process which plays an increasingly important practical and symbolic role in late modernity (Hirst 1997).

The combined effect of these related processes has been to increase interest in public attitudes and changing forms of toleration. However, as yet the investigation and understanding of how these attitudes are formed and transformed remains underdeveloped.

# Why tolerate?

It is clear that whatever one's beliefs are that one cannot express intolerance towards everything one dislikes or disapproves of. Toleration, therefore, is necessarily selective. The critical issues are how toleration is constructed, changed and expressed. Strategic decisions are often made in relation to pragmatic and moral considerations. The problem of analysis is that pragmatism and moralism tend to be interconnected. The main pragmatic consideration, often suggested by utilitarians, is that the benefits of toleration may outweigh the harms. Toleration may also enable us to mitigate or avoid damaging social conflict. The difficult question is, however, how do we make a distinction between acts which should be prevented and punished and those that should be permitted and tolerated. Harm itself is not a sufficient criterion of intolerance since the notion of harm is open to wide interpretation and comes in a multitude of different forms, while the decision about whether and how to respond will be conditioned by a range of other moral and practical considerations.

Primary amongst these considerations is the relation between the activities to be tolerated and the level of social support which is available. According to Richard Taub and his colleagues (Taub et al. 1984) in their study of community transition in Chicago, the exercise of tolerance is conditioned by the quality and the quantity of local amenities. The factors, they suggest, that will influence the capacity of different individuals and groups to tolerate different activities will include the organisation and density of housing, the seriousness of other local problems and the range and quality of amenities. It is also suggested that the level of tolerance is not just a function of the level of absolute deprivation in an area but often a consequence of relative deprivation. That is, intolerance is seen to arise from the gap between what people have got and what they expect (Campbell 1991). The focus on relative deprivation may go some way to explain the apparent paradox which has been reported that it is those groups located near the top as well as those at the bottom of the social scale who exhibit the greatest level of punitiveness (Brillon 1988).

In everyday discussions of toleration reference is often made to 'thresholds' and to 'the limits of tolerance', which suggests that there are critical points in the exercise of tolerance at which a qualitative change occurs. In this point of transition it would seem that activities which were once tolerated take on a different significance. The implications of this observation are that it is not only the number of incidents which is important but the point at which a threshold of toleration is crossed. Thus it may be the case that seven or eight prostitutes working in a certain locality

may be acceptable and although local residents may not particularly approve of the activity they are willing to tolerate it. However, at a certain point the visibility of, say, twelve women regularly working on the streets transforms the nature of the activity such that it is seen to 'swamp' or change the neighbourhood in a way that local residents are no longer willing to tolerate, and they call on the authorities to do something about it. This scenario appears by and large to have occurred in various parts of Britain during the 1980s, and although the relevant authorities were slow to respond to growing public pressure many residents groups took it upon themselves to deal with the problem (Matthews 1993). The other important implications of this observation are that firstly we need to give greater attention to the impact of crime and disorder in different areas and that, second, we need to identify the thresholds of tolerance. In this way we might become less concerned with the rise and fall of recorded offences -or with strategies which simply aim to reduce crime and disorder or other problems by an arbitrary amount -and instead develop a greater regional and local sensitivity to variations in the thresholds of toleration.

# Liberalism and communitarianism

The articulation and defence of toleration has historically been associated with the classic liberal theorists such as Locke and Hobbes and more recently the writings of Rawls (1971) and Dworkin (1977). In essence, the standard liberal defence of toleration is centred around the notion of respect for other persons and the defence of individual liberty. This is normally expressed in terms of the protection of rights. In this process the state is seen as a neutral arbiter between competing moralities. Therefore, in principle the state should not prescribe any particular moral or religious view but allow equal recognition to all citizens. The emphasis on respect for other persons is based upon the principle which maintains that citizens should be able to make choices about how they live and be able to act as autonomous and rational agents. Thus for liberals there is a private sphere of individual autonomy which the state should not interfere with unless an individual inflicts harm on another individual. The protection of a separate private sphere is seen to be a necessary condition for the maintenance of individual freedom.

This familiar liberal position has been the object of a sustained critique by communitarian thinkers who have taken issue with the individualistic premise of

the position as well as the preoccupation with rights and the associated conceptions of liberty, freedom and justice. This communitarian critique has gained some ascendancy sin~e the election of New Labour in 1997, and the government's thinking has been greatly influenced by the work of Amitai Etzioni (1993; 1997). This critique has direct implications for the status of the theory and practice of toleration since the distancing from liberalism suggests by implication a rejection of, or at least a shift away from, the liberal defence of toleration.

In contrast to liberalism the communitarian emphasises the primacy of the community, claiming that the self is built up intersubjectively. Communities, therefore, are more than a collection of autonomous individuals and they represent more than the sum of their parts. Communitarians have taken issue with the liberal emphasis on individual rights. Some have ~rgued that a rights-based policy is ultimately unsustainable since claims about competing rights are themselves difficult to resolve, and that these policies find themselves in the awkward position of deciding which rights to defend and which to prioritise over others, since the exercise of one person's rights often involves the infringement of the rights of others. Some communitarians accept that there are certain basic rights which should be defended such as the right to a fair trial, the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, and so forth, but most would endorse Etzioni's contention that liberals tend to place too much emphasis on individual rights and not enough on social obligations and duties. Communitarians also take issue with the liberal conception of freedom as a state of non-interference of the solitary individual. For the communitarian freedom is a social achievement through the guarantee of protection. It is not a state of chance but a process in which each citizen is equally protected by law (Braithwaite and Pettit 1990). The emphasis on equality draws attention to the importance of treating both the offender and the victim equally and in ways which are constructive but not overly intrusive (Walzer 1983).

One of the few criminologists who has examined the notion of tolerance from a communitarian perspective is John Braithwaite. In his influential study, 'Crime, Shame and Reintegration' (1989), he provides an explicit critique of liberal notions of toleration and argues that liberal tolerance can be counterproductive. For example, when parents allow their children to freely use illicit drugs, or engage in various forms of anti-social or undesirable behaviour without receiving any sanction, it can lead to the escalation and intensification of these problems. Braithwaite's argument is reminiscent in certain respects of Herbert Marcuse's (1965) critique

of 'pure tolerance', which he suggests can turn into 'repressive tolerance' when it does not address or remove social inequalities, but instead implicitly endorses and perpetuates them.

In contrast to liberalism, Braithwaite argues that: 'Low crime societies are societies where people do not mind their own business, where tolerance of deviance has definite limits, where communities prefer to handle their own crime problems rather than hand them over to professionals' (1989: 8) Moralising control through informal networks, he argues, is likely to be more effective than formal forms of 'repressive' social control which denies human dignity, limits autonomy and serves to confirm deviance as a master status. The aim for Braithwaite is to mobilise shaming strategies not simply in order to stigmatise deviants but instead to reintegrate them whenever possible back into the community. The important point here is that greater intolerance does not necessarily lead to greater punitiveness.

In opposition to the atomistic vision of order which is evident in strands of liberalism, it is argued by communitarians that the community structure itself shapes local crime rates by defining what is acceptable behaviour and by establishing normative structures which guide both the definitions of 'problematic situations' and how they are categorised. A communitarian notion of toleration is bound up with the defence of the community and the decision of whether to exercise tolerance or not will be conditioned by how valuable the community under threat is. Therefore, actions which may appear to be fairly innocuous can have a cumulative impact on the community and consequently can become the object of intolerance. However, in promoting intolerance the communitarian has to give due consideration to the level of harm inflicted as well as the capacity of the community to absorb or deflect these 'anti-social' activities as well as considering the consequences of stigmatising or marginal ising the offender since this may cumulatively weaken the community. It is also necessary for the communitarian to distinguish between interventions which are practically designed to improve community safety and those interventions which are more symbolic and are designed to regenerate moral obligations between citizens (Crisp 1992; Gutman 1985).

In general, the communitarian critique can be seen as providing a corrective to certain liberal conceptions of the autonomous self-propelling individual, although liberalism has not been without its defenders (Kymlicka 1989). As Allen Buchanan (1989) has pointed out, this ongoing debate between liberalism and communitarianism has operated on a number of different levels and that in trying

to think through these important issues it is useful to distinguish between radical, moderate and cautious communitarians. It is only in its radical version that communitarianism rejects outright the significance of individual rights and the liberal conception of freedom. In its more moderate version it concedes the importance of certain rights, but denies the priority which the liberal attributes to them. In its more cautious variant it urges those who value community not to abandon the framework of individual rights, but rather to appreciate the role which individual rights can play in protecting communities under certain historical conditions. In opposition to the radical communitarian he argues that the defence of individual rights of association, to pursue religious beliefs and the right to political participation need to be defended and that:

> Given the apparent diversity of the conditions of human flourishing, the pronouncement that the best life for all (or even most humans) requires participation in the most inclusive forms of political organisation is sheer dogmatism in the absence of a well-defended, highly particularistic, and absolutist theory of objective good.
>
> (Buchanan 1989: 859)

In the absence of such a point of reference individual rights allow individuals who are dissatisfied with current forms of community or who find existing communities unduly restrictive or oppressive to develop alternatives. Closing such a possibility raises for the liberal the spectre of totalitarianism. Moreover, as Axel Honneth (1995) has suggested, while it may be the case that self-confidence and self-identity are built up intersubjectively, the establishment of legal rights is important in recognising the dignity, autonomy and capacity of persons to act as morally responsible legal agents. He also argues that crime itself can be seen as a struggle of interests or as a clash of identities. Crime involves not only a material loss or a" physical violation but an attack upon individual identity. If crime only involved a material or physical deficit it would not be so socially important. It is precisely because it involves issues of recognition and identity that it takes on such a degree of significance, particularly in a period in which social recognition and identity formation are becoming increasingly problematic (Fraser 1997).

A major problem with the communitarian position in terms of crime prevention and community safety is that it is notoriously difficult to establish com-

munity strategies to reduce crime in high crime areas and probably even more difficult to sustain involvement in low crime areas. Further, social control tends to be maintained in the more affluent suburban communities by social avoidance, privatisation, low levels of interaction and through 'moral minimal ism' (Hope 1995). This notion of moral minimalism is reminiscent of Iris Young's (1990) depiction of modern urban communities as being composed of lightly engaged strangers. This state of affairs raises particular problems for communitarianism since it would appear that there is a growing emphasis upon difference and diversity within contemporary urban environments rather than on close-knit communities. Where new collectivities arise there is little evidence that they approximate to the notion of the ideal community. In fact, the individualism/community opposition is becoming less tenable and masks rather than elucidates the nature of modern urban groupings. Rather than seeing the individualism/community opposition as exhaustive, Iris Young sees them as mutually sustaining:

> Too often contemporary discussion of these issues sets up an exhaustive dichotomy between individualism and community. Community appears in the oppositions individualism/community, separated self/ shared self, private/public. But like most such terms, individualism and community have a common logic underlying their polarity, which makes it possible for them to define each other negatively. Each entails a denial of difference and a desire to bring multiplicity and heterogeneity into unity, though in opposing ways. Liberal individualism denies difference by positing the self as a solid, self-sufficient unity, not defined by anything or anyone other than itself. Its formalistic ethic of rights also denies difference by bringing all such separated individuals under a common measure of rights. Proponents of community, on the other hand, deny difference by positing fusion rather than separation as the social ideal. They perceive the social subject as a relation of unity or mutually composed by identification and symmetry among individuals within a totality. Communitarianism represents an urge to see persons in unity with one another in a shared whole.
>
> (Young 1990: 229)

It is the ideal of community, she argues, which by encouraging a sense of mutual

identification with some persons serves to problematise difference. The fear of difference can promote racism and class ism in society and fosters forms of exclusion and marginalisation, while simultaneously suppressing diversity.

Rather than seeing a movement towards the ideal of 'community' we appear to be witnessing the emergence of new groupings and forms of neo-tribalism centred around temporary forms of solidarity and political organisation which challenge rather than endorse the legitimacy of traditional moralities (Maffesoli 1996; Sennett 1991). In these 'tribes' membership is easily revocable and is not tied to long-term obligations. Their existence is transient and always in flux. In these transient urban networks the very notion of 'community' is becoming increasingly problematic. In the context of increasing contingency, ambivalence and fragmentation the search for 'community' appears more hopeless and unrealistic. The identification of consensus becomes more elusive and the ability to mobilise universal truths in order to sanction, humiliate or stigmatise becomes increasingly difficult. The construction of order begins to look more artificial and fragile. The protection of the 'community' as a geographicallybounded space of local networks, which is increasingly invoked by policy-makers as a justification for cracking down on various forms of anti-social behaviour, appears to coincide with the transformation and dissolution of these local networks.

Alongside the reorganisation and differentiation of communities the communitarians face a related problem. This is the demise of regulatory and socialising institutions. In much communitarian writing there is to be found a backward looking and often romantic vision of these institutions -the family, the school, the police, the prison and indeed the state. It is no accident, however, that they have repeatedly been referred to by commentators from across the political spectrum, as being in a state of 'crisis'. The implications of this assessment is that the pivotal traditional mechanisms through which social order and discipline are normally maintained are in disarray.

It is in this context that the repeated references to the relation between single parent households and delinquency should be seen. The suggestion that these parents are often irresponsible and feckless combined with calls for making parents take more responsibility for their children, overlooks the reality that such families lack resources to impose 'discipline' on children who live in a world in which there is great uncertainty about what constitutes an appropriate form of discipline. Therefore, attempts to salvage the 'cornflake' family are unlikely to work in the longer

term and instead of perpetuating a backwardlooking view of the role of weak and outdated institutions, the critical political question is how to establish the appropriate socialising and disciplinary mechanisms in a post-Ford~st and postmodern urban environment characterised by new forms of individualism and collectivism.

The paradox of the dominant forms of political thinking on both sides of the Atlantic is that they are guided by principles which are simultaneously wildly utopian and nostalgic and appear increasingly out of touch with the changing realities of urban life, while espousing a mixture of opportunistic and pragmatic policies couched in the language of managerialism.

There is a lingering problem about the scope, legitimacy and accountability of state institutions which classic liberalism finds difficult to address because it was designed to protect society from the state, rather than deal with the problems of liberty in a state and civil society dominated by large hierarchical institutions (Hirst 1997). Thus the attempts of liberalism to shape and develop state power and improve accountability have been largely ineffective. The weakness of communitarianism, on the other hand, in this respect and its failure to confront and reform institutions derives from its desire to urge a consensus on a deeply divided society with plural and competing values.

By contrast to those 'moral communitarians' who see the solution to problems of crime and community safety through the creation of informal control mechanisms and particularly through shaming, Tim Hope (1995) has argued there are two dimensions along which crime control strategies work in communities:

> The first is a 'horizontal' dimension of social relations among individuals and groups sharing a common residential space. This dimension refers to the often complex expressions of affection, loyalty, reciprocity, or dominance amongst residents, whether expressed through informal relationships or organised activities. Second, there is a 'vertical' dimension of relations that connect local institutions to sources of power and resources in the wider civil society of the locality is acknowledged to be a part.
>
> (Hope 1995: 24)

Although these two dimensions are related it is the case that:

> While the principal mechanisms for maintaining local order may be expressed primarily through the horizontal dimension, the strength of the expression -and hence its effectiveness in controlling crime -derives, in large part, from the vertical connections that residents of localities have to extracommunal resources.
>
> (Hope 1995: 24)

Although research has shown that community organising in some locations can make a difference (Sampson et al. 1997), the ability of residential communities to withstand the impact of different forms of crime and incivilities will depend in large part on the available resources and their access to support networks (Cullen 1994; Matthews 1992).

If it is the case that the cautious communitarian can establish some degree of compromise with the liberals over rights, there still remains a major split between those communitarians who prioritise the community and community controls and those liberals who see crime control and community safety as an individual responsibility within a market-driven framework. This tension is located at the heart of current government thinking on 'law and order'. In the post-welfarist society, the emphasis on individual self-help and 'freedom' consists in extracting oneself from the supposed restraints and debilitating consequences of welfare. Government policy encourages the individualisation and commodification of security, offering only minimum guarantees, above which individuals are encouraged to take responsibility for themselves. This neo-liberal notion of 'freedom' and responsibility, in turn, influences notions of personal morality and the dependent subject of welfarism is replaced by the juridical subject of neo-liberalism (Pratt 1996). It is in this context that we can begin to make sense of the contradictory policy initiatives which on one side establish agencies to reduce social exclusion, while at the same time implement a reduction in welfare payments to marginalised populations: and how at one moment the government is advocating minimum mandatory sentences for burglary, drug dealing and violence, while at another it is generously funding programmes of restorative justice and community programmes for disaffected youth.

The tension between market-based policies and more socially-oriented policies creates further difficulties for 'balancing' communitarian approaches with liberalism. Most communitarians have a commitment to distributive justice but

often defer to market mechanisms for the overall allocation of resources. This has resulted in a growing divide between the rich and the poor as well as growing regional disparities. As inequality increases, the basis of the communitarian vision begins to collapse since it undermines the realisation of both social and distributive justice, while creating new conflicts and antagonisms (Walzer 1983). The major difficulty for policy-makers is the formulation of realistic criteria by which the balance between rights and duties could be struck. Despite the proliferation of official pronouncements, reports and glossy publications there are no identifiable criteria of how and where to intervene, when to express intolerance, how to balance up social protection and individual rights and how to decide on the appropriate response (see Braithwaite and Pettit 1990) .

Some recognition of these difficulties has been expressed by Anthony Giddens (1998) in his elaboration of a 'Third Way', which constitutes an attempt to move beyond neo-liberalism and old-style statism and collectivism. Although he recognises that the ideal of 'community' is no longer a realisable objective and that the modern world is characterised by diversity, increasing 'ontological insecurity' and rising crime, his policy programme involves a mixture of public order and community policing as well as the development of local multi-agency interventions incorporating a range of state and non-state agencies, with a particular focus on the expansion of the voluntary sector. In these proposals he seems to be unaware of the fact that this is precisely the mixture of strategies which has been employed over the last decade or so under both New Labour and previous conservative governments and that it is precisely the effective~ess of this combination of strategies which is currently in question (see Crawford in this volume).

Thus although it may be possible to develop a theoretical compromise by adopting a more cautious form of communitarianism the danger is that in the absence of any clear principles or criteria for intervention, government policy is seen as either oscillating uncontrollably between a free-market mechanism and the promotion of idealised communities or alternatively falling between these two objectives. Ultimately, however, it has been suggested that the difficulty of working out such a conceptual and political compromise has been that much more difficult because the social relations and social structures around which these divisions have been historically articulated are themselves in a process of transformation and reconstruction. Thus, it would appear that this longstanding political antagonism between liberalism and communitarianism is being overtaken by events and that

there is a growing sense in which classical liberalism is unable to defend individual liberty against the growing power of an unchecked corporate and managerial elite; while old-style communitarianism seeks to restore ailing institutions by trying to change people's values in an attempt to avoid engaging in major organisational and structural reforms. Paradoxically, however, the current drive towards 'modernisation' encourages greater diversity and flexibility, the fragmentation of traditional communities, new forms of social exclusion, the problematisation of identities, the rise of neotribalism and creates a growing lack of moral consensus in a world in which ever greater percentages of the population are becoming 'problems' (Bauman 1995; Young 1999).

## Conclusion

In general, a number of social and political commentators seem to agree that toleration is an important element in the functioning of liberal democracies. But debates continue about where to draw the line between tolerance and intolerance and how such 'moral' decisions are linked to images of the 'good society'. Increasingly, criminologists have become aware that toleration plays an important, if not pivotal, role in the construction of crime and in influencing crime control policies. As we move into a situation in which the public are an increasingly important point of reference in providing information, co-operation and legitimacy within a restructured system of regulation a greater awareness of what the public want and what they are willing to accept has gained greater prominence. Alongside these organisational imperatives there have been growing demands for security from different social groups and a greater willingness to participate, at some level, in the development of community safety.

These developments have opened the door to greater community involvement in decision-making and to the introduction of new forms of accountability. The shifting responsibility for crime control and community safety to local authorities has been identified as a 'sea change' or a 'watershed' in policy development in Britain, introdUCing new forms of governance (Crawford 1997). There is now a clear sense of the limits of the nation-state and that there is no way back to the centralised forms of regulation which characterised previous periods. The watch words are now diversity, flexibility, cost-effectiveness and risk management.

Within this changing framework the relation between tolerance, forms of punishment, the distribution of justice and security become more problematic. There is an issue at one level of how to balance tolerance and intolerance, rights and obligations, as well as guilt and justice (Cohen 1979). There are no clear principles which tell us how such a balance is to be struck. At a second, and related, level there is an issue of how to identify, analyse and express forms of toleration.

The pursuit of tolerance and intolerance is not mutually exclusive. There is also nothing intrinsically negative or undesirable about intolerance. Intolerance can be instructive and constructive, just as the application of tolerance can be damaging and repressive in certain situations. In fact, to argue for tolerance in the abstract can be vacuous and counterproductive. If it is the case, however, that the aim of government policy is to argue for a different balance between tolerance and intolerance or for an increase in specific forms of toleration then a number of material, relational and social issues need to be addressed. On one level material inequalities and deprivations need to be reduced. This is an issue of distributive justice. At another level issues of recognition, solidarity and identity require serious consideration. These issues are bound up with notions of social justice. The spheres of distributional and social justice are directly and indirectly linked and are conceptually connected through notions of 'fairness' in the distribution of rewards and deserts. These notions, in turn, will influence the expression of toleration.

It has also been suggested that seeing the business of crime control and communiL)' safety through an examination of toleration could provide a very different vantage point for analysing and evaluating policy developments. However, the mechanisms for investigating and channelling public attitudes remain underdeveloped. The current preoccupation with the relatively arbitrary reductions in officially recorded crime rates and the emphasis on developing policy through the cumulative production of 'evidence' constructed through a series of uncoordinated, patchy and idiosyncratic forms of research stands in contrast to the suggestion that crime and crime control policies are profoundly influenced by shifts in public tolerance, however restricted its expression might be.

The approach of the present British Labour government, we have argued, involves an uneasy and unresolved mix of liberal and communitarian ideas on toleration, rights and justice. These two philosophies were always in themselves problematic, but it has been suggested that the changing problem of security facing different social groups and the tranformation of 'communities' has rendered these

modes of thinking even more problematic. The current impasse will require some serious rethinking. It is a problem which involves three aspects, first, a change in the nature of risks and hazards which individuals and groups face; second, a change in the social relations, social networks and associated identities; and third, it involves the changing nature of the socialising and regulatory mechanisms which are in place to shape and control these developments. The interrelated nature of these problems makes the possibility of a 'quick fix' resolution increasingly untenable and calls instead for a fundamental re-examination of crime and control and this in tum, we have suggested, will involve the mobilisation of certain basic organising and sensitising concepts such as toleration.

# References

Bauman, Z. (1995) Life in Fragments: Essays in Postmodern Morality, Oxford: Blackwell.

Bayley, D. (1994) Police for the Future, New York: Oxford University Press.

Box, S. and Hale, C. (1986) 'Unemployment, Crime and Imprisonment: The Enduring Problem of Prison Overcrowding', in R. Matthews and ]. Young (eds) Confronting Crime, London: Sage.

Braithwaite, J. (1989) Crime, Shame and Reintegration, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

--and Pettit, P. (1990) Not Just Deserts: A Republican Theory of Criminal Justice, Oxford: Clarendon.

Brillon, Y. (1988) 'Punitiveness, Status and Ideology in Three Canadian Provinces', in N. Walker and M. Hough (eds) Public Attitudes to Sentencing, Aldershot: Gower.

Buchanan, A. (1989) 'Assessing the Communitarian Critique of Liberalism', Ethics, 99 (July): 852-82.

Burney, E. (1999) Crime and Banishment, Winchester: Waterside Press.

Campbell, A. (1991) The Sense of Well Being in America, New York: McGraw Hill.

Cohen, M. (1998) Culture ofIntolerance, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Cohen, S. (1979) 'Guilt Justice and Tolerance: Some Old Concepts for a New Criminology', in D. Downes and P. Rock (eds) Deviant Interpretations, Oxford: Martin Robertson.

Crawford, A. (1997) The Local Governance of Crime: Appeals to Community and Partnerships, Oxford: Clarendon.

--(1998) Crime Prevention and Community Safety, London: Longman.

Crisp, R. (1992) 'Communitarianism and Toleration', in ]. Horton and P. Nicholson (eds) Toleration: Philosophy and Practice, Aldershot: Avebury.

Cullen, F. (1994) 'Social Support as an Organising Concept for Criminology', Justice Quarterly, 11(4): 527-59.

Dennis, N. (1997) (ed.) Zero Tolerance: Policing in a Free Society, London: Institute of Economic Affairs.

Doob, A. and Roberts,]. (1988) 'Public Punitiveness and Public Knowledge of the Facts: Some Canadian Surveys', in N. Walker and M. Hough (eds) Public Attitudes to Sentencing, Aldershot: Gower.

Downes, D. (1988) Contrmts in Tolerance: Post-war Penal Policy in the Netherlands and in England and Wales, Oxford: Clarendon.

Dworkin, R. (1977) Taking Rights Seriously, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

Elias, N. (1994) The Civilising Process, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Etzioni, A. (1993)The Spirit of Community, New York: Crown Publishers.

--(1997) The New Golden Rule, London: Profile Books.

Foucault, M. (1979) History of Sexuality: Volume 1, Allen Lane: Penguin.

Franke, H. (1990) 'Dutch Tolerance: Facts and Fables', British Journal of Criminology, 30(1): 81-94.

--(1992) 'The Rise and Decline of Solitary Confinement', British Journal ()f Crimi-

nology, 32(2): 125-43.

Fraser, N. (1997) Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflectiom on the Post-Socialist Condition, New York: Routledge.

Garland, D. (1990) Punishment and Modem Society, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

--(1996) 'The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Control in Contemporary Society', British Journal of Criminology, 36(4): 445-71.

Giddens, A. (1998) The Third Way, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Goffman, E. (1963) Stigma: Notes on the Management of a Spoiled Identity, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Gutman, A. (1985) 'Communitarian Critics of Liberalism', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 14(3): 308-22.

Hancock, L. (2001) Community, Crime and Disorder: Responses to Change in Urban Neighbourhoods, London: Palgrave.

Harrison, R. (1992) Tolerating the Offensive', in J. Horton and P. Nicholson (eds) Toleration: Philosophy and Practice, Aldershot: Avebury.

Herbst, S. (1998) Reading Public Opinion, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hirst, P. (1997) From Statism to Pluralism, London: UCL Press.

Home Officc (1998) Annual Report, Cm. 3908, London: HMSO.

Honneth, A. (1995) The Struggle for Recognition, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Hope, T. (1995) 'Community Crime Prevention', in M. Tonry and D. Farrington (eds) Building a Safer Society: Strategic Approaches to Crime Prevention, volume 19, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Horton, J. and Nicholson, P. (1992) (eds) Toleration: Philosophy and Practice, Aldershot: Avebury. Hough, M. and Roberts, J. (1999) 'Sentencing Trends in Britain: Public Knowledge and Public Opinion', Punishment and Society, 1(1): 11-27.

Hughes, G. (1998) Understanding Crime Prevention, Buckingham: Open Univer-

sity Press.

Jessop, B. (1994) 'Post-Fordism and the State', in A. Amin (cd.) Post-Fordism: A Reader, Oxford: Blackwell.

Johnston, L. (1996) 'What is Vigilantism?', British Joumal of Criminology, 36(2): 220-36.

Kymlicka, W. (1989) Liberalism, Community and Culture, Milton Keynes: Open University Press.

Langham, P. and Farrington, D. (1998) Crime and Justice in the United States and in England and Wales, 1981-96, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Washington DC: US Department of Justice.

Lea, J. (1992) 'The Analysis of Crime', in J. Young and R. Matthews (eds) Rethinking Criminology: The Realist Debate, London: Sage.

Mcintyre (1981) After Virtue, London: Duckworth.

Maffesoli, M. (1996) The Time of the Tribes: The Decline of Individualism in Mass Society, London: Sage.

Marcuse, H. (1965) 'Repressive Tolerance', in R. P. Wolff, B. M. Moore Jr. and H. Marcuse (eds) A Critique of Pure Tolerance, Boston: Beacon Press.

Matthews, R. (1992) 'Replacing Broken Windows: Crime Incivilities and Urban Change', in R. Matthews and ]. Young (eds) Issues in Realist Criminology, London: Sage.

--(1993) Kerb-Crawling, Prostitution and Multi-Agency Policing, Paper 43 Crime Prevention Unit Series, London: Home Office.

--and Young, J. (1992) 'Reflections on Realism', in J. Young and R. Matthews (cds) Rethinking Criminology: The Realist Debate, London: Sage.

Mendus, S. (1989) Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism, London: Macmillan.

Mirrlees-Black, c., Mayhew, P. and Percy, A. (1996) The 1996 British Crime Survey, England and Wales, London: Home Office.

Moynihan, D. (1993) 'Defining Deviance Down', American Scholar, 62 (Winter):

17-30. Muncie, J. (1999) 'Institutional Intolerance: Youth Justice and the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act', Critical Social Policy, 19(2): 147-75.

Newey, G. (1999) Virtue, Reason and Toleration: The Place of Tbleration in Ethical and Political Theory, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Norris, P. (1999) Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance, New York: Oxford University Press.

Offe, C. (1996) Modernity and the State: East, West, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Pahl,]. (1985) Private Violence and Public Policy, London: Routledge and Kegan PauL

Pease, K. (1994) 'Cross-national Imprisonment Rates', in R. King and M. Maguire (eds) Prisons in Context, Oxford: Clarendon.

Podolefsky, A. and Dubow, E (1981) Strategies for Community Crime Prevention: Collective Responses to Crime in Urban America, Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas.

Pratt, J. (1996) 'Reflections on Recent Trends in the Punishment of Persistence', Crime, Law and Social Change, 25: 243-64.

 --(1998) 'Towards the Decivilising of Punishment', Social and Legal Studies, 7(4): 487-515.

Rawls, J. (1971) A Theory ofJustice, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

Sampson, R. J., Raudenbush, S. W. and Earles, E (1997) 'Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy', Science 277 (August): 918-24.

Sandal, M. (1982) Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Saraga, E. (1996) 'Dangerous Places: The Family as a Site of Crime', in J. Muncie and E. McLaughlin (eds) The Problem of Crime, London: Sage.

Schur, E. (1971) Labelling Deviant Behaviour, New York: Harper and Row.

Sennett, R. (1991) The Conscience of the Eye, New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Skogan, W. G. (1988) 'Community Organizations and Crime', in M. Tonry and N. Morris (eds) Crime and Justice a Review of Research, volume 10, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Spierenburg, P. (1984) The Spectacle of Suffering, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Straw, J. (1999) Foreword to the 'Government's Crime Reduction Strategy', London: Home Office.

Sumner, C. (J 990) Censure, Politics and Criminal Justice, Milton Keynes: Open University Press.

Taub, R., Taylor, D. and Dunham, J. (1984) Paths of Neighbourhood Change: Race and Crime in Urban America, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Tonry, M. (1995) Malign Neglect: Race Crime and Punishment in America, New York: Oxford University Press.

Turner, M. and Cullen, E, Sundt, J. and Applegate, B. (1997) 'Public Support for Community Based Sanctions', The Prison Journal, 77(1): 6-26.

Van Krieken, R. (1989) 'Violence, Self Discipline and Modernity: Beyond the Civilising Process', Sociological Review, 37: 193-218.

Vaughan, B. (2000) 'The Civilising Process and the Janus Face of Modern Punishment', Theoretical Criminology, 4(1): 71-93.

Walzer, M. (1983) Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality, New York: Basic Books.

Wilkins, L. and Pease, K. (1987) 'Public Demand for Punishment', Intemational} oumal of Sociology and Social Policy 7(3): 16-29.

Young, L (1990) 'The Ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference', in L. Nicholson (ed.) Feminism/Postmodemism, New York: Routledge.

Young,]. (1999) The Exclusive Society, London: Sage.

Young, W. and Brown, M. (1993) 'Cross National Comparisons ofImprisonment', in M. Tonry (ed.) Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, volume 17, Chicago:

University of Chicago Press.

Yovel, Y. (1998) 'Tolerance as Grace and as Rightful Recognition', Social Research, 65(4): 897-921.